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The writer favors the opposite position, namely, that no abrogation
should be grarited, in cases where the basis for the petition is pecuniary
interests, such as title to property, heirship, and the like. Either on the
grounds of estoppel, or simply in principles of equity, adoptive parents
should not be permitted to alter the status of the child as it best suits
their financial interests for the moment.
Joseph T. Helling.
Domestic Relations
CIVIL CONSEQUENCES OF MARRIAGE WITHIN STATUTORY
PROHIBITION: EFFECT OF A REMOVAL OF THE IMPEDIMENT
In the United States statutory provisions concerning marriage are
multiple and diversified. The legislatures of each state, empowered by
constitutional authority to protect and safeguard public morals, have
enacted what may be termed protective standards in regard to classes
of people who may legally enter into a marital relationship. This power
to forbid certain types of marriages is indisputable.' Generally, a formal-
ly celebrated marriage is valid for all purposes. To this postulate, how-
ever, there are two well recognized exceptions: (1) marriages deemed
contrary to the Christian Law of Nature, and (2) marriages which the
law making body of the forum regards as inimical to the welfare of its
citizens.
Ascertaining the civil effects of a prohibited marriage involves es-
sentially a determination of whether the specific marriage is void or
merely voidable. A void marriage usually permits of no rights to either
party, whereas a marriage deemed voidable possesses legal significance
in every aspect until directly attacked.2 Difficult is the task confronting
a court in the interpretation of many of these statutes which are all but
clear in their meaning. A statute may employ the word "void" in its
provisions, but where legislative intent clearly indicates that the word
should be interpreted as meaning "voidable," there is little hesitancy to
so declare.3 The trend is away from the stigmatic word "void," especial-
1 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 572 (1906); Gould v. Gould, 78 Conn.
242, 61 AUt. 604 (1905); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 206 N.Y. 341, 99 N.E. 845
(1912).
2 Sutton v. Leib, 199 F.2d 163, 164 (7th Cir. 1952) ; Hitchens v. Hitchens, 47
F. Supp. 73, 76 (D.D.C. 1942) ; Ex parte Bowen, 247 S.W.2d 379 (Ky. 1952) ; Simp-
son v. Neely, 221 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); In re Romano's Estate, 40
Wash. 796, 246 P.2d 501 (1952).
3 Harrison v. State, 22 Md. 468 (1864); Hall v. Baylous, 109 W.Va. 1, 153 S.E.
293, 296 (1930), stating: "Admitting that the decisions are in confusion and that the
word "void" used in the statutes may be interpreted as "voidable," all decisions are
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ly where the impediment is such that it may not have been easily
ascertained by both parties prior to their contract.4 The legal difference
between a marriage contract and other contracts adds impetus to this
disapprobation of the word "void." r
A marriage is considered voidable when under any circumstances it
is possible for the respective parties to contract the marriage, or subse-
quently to ratify it by other acts manifesting an intent to continue their
relationship. 6 It is void if a statute expressly declares it so, or if sub-
sequent ratification is impossible. 7 A marriage held to be void ab initio
is valid for no legal purpose, and its invalidity may be maintained in any
court proceeding, at any time, whether the question arises directly or
collaterally.8 Most jurisdictions require no decree of its nullity.9 A void-
able marriage and its imperfections may be inquired into only during
zhe lives of the contractants and only in a suit instituted specifically for
that purpose.10 The death of one of the parties serves to bar controversy
and accords to the survivor all resultant rights."
The purpose of this writer in Part I is to enumerate generally what
civil rights are acquired by the parties to a relationship prohibited by
statute. Part II will concern the effect of the removal of the disability
upon the marriage and the rights of the parties concerned.
in accord that, where the intent of the lawmakers can be ascertained by use of well-
known rules of constructions, the word should always receive its natural force and
effect."
4 See 1 SCHOULER, MARRIAGE, DIvORcE, SEPARATION AND DOmEsTic RELATIONS
§ 14 (6th ed. 1921). "Statutes both in England and America have greatly modified
the ancient law of valid marriages, and it can only be affirmed in general terms that
the legislative tendency is to make marriages voidable rather than void, wherever
the impediment is such as might not have been readily known to both parties before
marriage, and where public policy does not rise superior to all considerations of pri-
vate utility. Modem civilization strongly condemns the harsh doctrine of ab initio
sentences of nullity .... "
5 State v. Yoder, 113 Minn. 503, 130 N.W. 10, 11 (1911), states: "The mar-
riage contract is sui generis, and essentially differs from the ordinary affairs of life,
and the rules and principles of law controlling contract rights ... should not be held
in all respects applicable to the marriage contract."
6 Jones v. Jones, 119 Fla. 824, 161 So. 836 (1935); Fensterwald v. Burk, 129
Md. 131, 98 Atl. 358 (1916), dismissed, 248 U.S. 592 (1918); Fearnow v. Jones, 34
Okla. 694, 126 Pac. 1015, 1018 (1912).
7 State v. Yoder, 113 Minn. 503, 130 N.W. 10 (1911); Fearnow v. Jones, 34
Okla. 694, 126 Pac. 1015 (1912); Toler v. Oakland Smokeless Coal Corp., 173 Va.
425, 4 S.E.2d 364 (1939).
8 Sutton v. Leib, 199 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1952); Simpson v. Neely, 221 S.W.2d
303, 308 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); In re Romano's Estate, 40 Wash.2d 796, 246 P.2d
501, 506 (1952).
9 Sutton v. Leib, 199 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1952); United States v. Lutwak, 195
F.2d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 1952) (See cases cited therein).
10 See cases cited in Hitchens v. Hitchens, 47 F. Supp. 73, 77 (D.D.C. 1942);
In re Romano's Estate, 40 Wash.2d 796, 246 P.2d 501 (1952).
11 1 BISHOP, ARRiAGE, DIVORcE AND SEPARATION § 258 (1891).
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A. Effects of a bigamous marriage.
All jurisdictions in the United States, by statute or judicial decision,
uniformly condemn bigamous marriages and provide for civil and
criminal sanctions. Statutes in most states derive their provisions basical-
ly from common law principles; enacting that marriage by one spouse
during the life of the other is null and void ab initio, thus barring any
marital rights gained from legal union and bastardizing all issue. Legis-
latures of many states, however, realizing the need for the protection of
innocent parties and unoffending children have stipulated certain excep-
tions to this harsh rule. In other instances, courts applying the familiar
maxims of equity have rendered decisions giving at least some satisfac-
tion to the innocent party, of times a difficult task in light of many of the
modem statutes. Many statutes specifically provide that issue of mar-
riages null and void in law are to be considered legitimate in spite of the
fact that the relationship is meretricious. Included in many of these
statutes are issues of bigamists. 12
The invalidity of a bigamous marriage may be maintained in any type
proceeding, whether the question arises directly or collaterally,13 and at
any time. 14 Consequently, it has "no standing in court," and may be
disregarded as ever having been a marriage.' 5 Consent of the parties will
in no way cure a marriage when it is void ab initio6, nor will the sub-
sequent divorce of the illegally married spouse from his or her first
mate.' 7 A few jurisdictions provide for annulment or make bigamy a
ground for divorce, but this by no means serves to validate the union
prior to judicial dissolution.18 A decree of nullity by the court does no
more than judicially declare void what was already void in fact.19 One of
the purposes of statutory provision for annulment is to enable affected
parties to secure a binding judicial record so that the invalidity of the
marriage cannot later be disputed.20 However, it has been held in Penn-
sylvania that a marriage void ab initio must be annuled as a matter of
record before either party is again free to marry.21
12 For an example of a case construing such a statute see Shamblin v. State
Compensation Comm'r, 122 W.Va. 652, 12 S.E.2d 527 (1940).
13 Jardine v. Jardine, 291 Ill. App. 152, 9 N.E.2d 645 (1937).
14 Ex parte Bowen, 247 S.W.2d 379 (Ky. 1952).
15 United States v. Lutwak, 195 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1952).
16 Poole v. Schrichte, 39 Wash.2d 558, 236 P.2d 1044 (1951).
17 Pewitt v. Pewitt, 192 Tenn. 227, 240 S.W.2d 521 (1951).
18 Pettit v. Pettit, 105 App. Div. 312, 93 N.Y. Supp. 1001 (3d Dep't 1905) ; Klaas
v. Klaas, 14 Pa. Super. 550 (1900); Cook v. Cook, 116 Vt. 374, 76 A.2d 593, 597
(1950) (stating that the purpose of the annulment statute is to preserve "the good
order of society and for the peace of mind of all persons concerned. .. ")
19 Stierlen v. Stierlen, 6 Cal. App. 420, 92 Pac. 329 (1907); Cook v. Cook, 116
Vt. 374, 76 A.2d 593, 597 (1950).
20 Cook v. Cook, 116 Vt. 374, 76 A.2d 593 (1950).
21 Kooistra v. Kooistra, 28 Del. Co. 19 (1938).
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At common law, and unless interdicted by statute, a marriage con-
tracted in good faith after seven years absence of a spouse is usually held
to be voidable, and its invalidity would necessarily have to be attacked
in a suit instituted for that purpose2 2 Presumptions based on absence
vary from two to seven years, with some statutes demanding additional
proof of the death of the missing spouse.23 In New York, absence of one
spouse for more than seven years affords no presumption of death, but
a subsequent solemnly celebrated marriage by the remaining spouse is
valid even though the first spouse may yet be living2 4 In California,
evidence supporting the existence of the first mate does not controvert
the presumptive validity of the second marriage but is merely evidence
that divorce or an annulment has not been obtained.25 Perhaps the
majority of jurisdictions are in accord. The holding of the Mississippi
court seems unduly strict. In Frank v. Frank,26 the court held that
absence for the statutory period and reappearance by the absconding
spouse renders the second marriage void ab initio. The better rule, fol-
lowed in many states, is to make the second marriage merely voidable,2 7
the courts recognizing that the person at fault in such situations is
usually the absent spouse.
Although good faith will not affect the voidness of a bigamous mar-
riage, the guilty party is usually precluded, by decision, from seeking
the aid of a court of equity.28 A woman living illicitly with a married
man and performing the duties of a married woman but who has knowl-
edge of the impediment acquires no rights from the relationship.2 Con-
trary to the rule that a husband or wife cannot sue for a tort committed
by the other during coverature one case held that the supposed wife
may be sued in malicious prosecution."0 The legal wife also may be pre-
22 Grand Lodge K. of P. v. Barnard, 9 Ga. App. 71, 70 S.E. 678, 680 (1911)
23 For a compilation of the statutory absence periods of each state see 1 VxiER,
AamRcIAN FAuIrY LAWS § 46 (2d ed. 1931). A case involving a typical statute is
Woodmen of the World v. irick, 58 F. Supp. 202 (E.D. S.C. 1944).
24 Hatfield v. United States, 127 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1942).
25 Goff v. Goff, 52 Cal. App.2d 23, 125 P.2d 848 (1942).
26 193 Miss. 605, 10 So.2d 839 (1942) (a dissent urged a contrary decision be-
cause of bastardization of the issue of the second marriage).
27 E.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 61 (1949).
28 Rooney v. Rooney, 54 N.J. Eq. 231, 34 AtI. 682 (Ch. 1896); Berry v. Berry,
130 App. Div. 53, 114 N.Y. Supp. 497 (1st Dep't 1909).
29 Beidler v. Beidler, 161 Fla. 250, 43 So.2d 329 (1949) (where the failure of the
wife to disclose her prior existing marriage gave rise to an action in fraud for monies
expended in her support and for the purchase of other property by her); Duenser v.
Supreme Council, 262 IlI. 475, 104 N.E. 801 (1914) (barring the right of support);
Di Donato v. Di Donato, 156 Pa. Super. 382, 40 A.2d 892 (1945) (barring support
even though husband was not innocent); Smith v. Smith, 255 Wis. 96, 38 N.W.2d
12 (1949) (refusal of an equitable distribution of property).
30 Watson v. Watson, 39 Cal.2d 305, 240 P.2d 1005 (1952). But cf. Callow v.
Thomas, 322 Mass. 550, 78 N.E.2d 637 (1948).
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cluded from any claim against her first husband where equitable princi-
ples forbid.31
Property, both real and personal, acquired by participants to a void
marriage during their relationship will usually be apportioned ratably if
the "clean hands" theory is not strained.3 2 In most states, the party
seeking relief is left to his remedies as an unmarried individual, 33
namely: joint effort by agreement,34 enforcement of the community
property plan, utilized mostly in the western states,35 or mere unjust
enrichment.36 Where community property rights are recognized it is
immaterial how the property was acquired.37 It is essential, however,
that the moving party must have married in good faith.38
A conveyance of real estate to the cohabitors as man and wife does
not create a tenancy by the entirety. The parties become tenants in
common, giving the heirs of the respective parties their consequent
rights.39 However, it has been held that if one of the parties, on the
decease of the other, conveys to bona fide purchasers, the heirs of the
dead spouse may not be heard to complain, their equities being super-
ceded by the innocence of the grantees. 40 The courts are in conflict as to
whether property given or conveyed between the spouses as husband
and wife should be given effect. Generally, good faith decides the fate
of the wife.41 If the grantor is the innocent party, it would seem the
more equitable rule to set aside such conveyance and at least restore the
status quo.42
Parties to a marriage which is formally celebrated but to which an
impediment exists are participants to a common law putative marriage
31 In re Fingerlin's Estate, 167 Misc. 770, 4 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Surr. Ct. 1938).
32 Garza v. Fernandez, 74 Ariz. 312, 248 P.2d 869 (1952), the fact of the exist-
ence of a meretricious relationship does not bar claims to property acquired during
the period thereof, where such claim is based upon general principles of law without
regard to the existence of a marital status. See also Smith v. Smith, 255 Wis. 96, 38
N.W.2d 12 (1949), where a court of equity would not aid the bigamists in dividing
their property.
33 Baker v. Baker, 222 Minn. 169, 23 N.W.2d 582 (1946).
34 Bracken v. Bracken, 52 S.D. 252, 217 N.W. 192, 194 (1927). The same rule
would apply in case of an implied agreement, Chrismond v. Chrismond, 211 Miss.
746, 52 So.2d 624 (1951). Partnership distribution was involved in Poole v.
Schrichte, 39 Wash.2d 558, 236 P.2d 1044 (1951).
35 Santos v. Santos, 32 Cal. App.2d 62, 89 P.2d 164 (1939).
36 See cases cited in Anderson v. Anderson, 7 Cal.2d 265, 60 P.2d 290, 291 (1936).
37 Santos v. Santos, supra note 35.
38 Valera v. Vallera, 21 Cal.2d 681, 134 P.2d 761 (1943).
39 Kerivan v. Fogal, 156 Fla. 92, 22 So.2d 584 (1945); Debnam v. Debnam, 63
Pa. D. & C. 700 (1948) (a petition for partition was dismissed, the parties erroneous-
ly believing their acquisition to be by the entireties).
40 Kerivan v. Fogal, 156 Fla. 92, 22 So.2d 584 (1945).
41 Taylor v. Taylor,. 66 Cal. App.2d 390, 152 P.2d 480 (1944); In re Seifert's
Estate, 145 Misc. 503, 260 N.Y. Supp. 397 (Surr. Ct. 1932).
42 Kantor v. Kantor, 133 NJ. Eq. 491, 33 A.2d 110 (Ch. 1943).
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if such disability is unknown to either or to both of them. Such innocence
in marriage is protected by statute and decision in a decided majority
of jurisdictions. The majority rule, however, requires a formal ceremony
in addition to absolute good faith.43 Third party information is insuffi-
cient to break the element of bona fides,4 4 nor does the ill repute of the
moving party.45 A putative relationship ceases upon the acquisition of
knowledge of the impediment, and the rights obtained include only
those existing prior to such actual knowledge.46 The good faith of at
least one of the parties also serves to legitimate all issue of the union.
47
The putative relationship is termed confidential, consequently the rights
accruing are those put into the marriage by the respective parties.48
The agreement of the parties as to how the property acquired by them
was to be held guides the extent of the relief. 49 Errors of law or fact do
not preclude recovery by the innocent spouse.50
Many jurisdictions, including New York, apply the principles of
estoppel to aid in the protection of the innocent, holding in effect that
obligations assumed by the guilty spouse may not be repudiated. 51 One
court held that the second marriage must continue in effect, if the first
husband has been sentenced to death, until termination by the innocent
party.5 2 The Ohio Supreme Court has been most liberal in holding that
even though the wife knew of the impediment and continued living
meretriciously, she possessed an insurable interest.53
B. Effect of Marriage by Parties Under Statutory Age.
The necessary age in which a marriage contract may legally be
entered into has undergone a decided change since early common and
canon law. The required age, however, differs radically among the states
and differs decidedly from the legal age demanded in other types of
43 Papoutsis v. Treviano, 167 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942). But cf. In re
Jackson's Estate, 112 Cal. App.2d 16, 245 P.2d 684 (1952); Succession of Marinoni,
183 La. 776, 164 So. 797 (1935) (good faith alone was held to be sufficient).
44 Howard v. Ingle, 180 So. 248 (La. App. 1938).
45 Ibid.
46 Barkley v. Dumke, 99 Tex. 150, 87 S.W. 1147, 1148 (1905).
47 Scott v. Brown Paper Mill Co., 174 So. 212 (La. App. 1937).
48 Anderson v. Anderson, 7 Cal.2d 265, 60 P.2d 290 (1936) (equal division of
property); Walker v. Walker, 330 Mich. 332, 47 N.W.2d 633 (1951) (contribution
for unjust enrichment).
49 Eaton v. Eaton, 125 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
50 Succession of Lynch v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 674 (W.D. La. 1936),
woman who in good faith remarried, believing conviction and sentencing of her
husband to a penitentiary gave her an automatic divorce was a putative wife despite
a mistake of law. Cf. In re Lindewall's Will, 287 N.Y. 347, 39 N.E.2d 907 (1942).
51 Krause v. Krause, 282 N.Y. 355,26 N.E.2d 290 (1940).
52 Jones v. Jones, 249 App. Div. 470, 292 N.Y. Supp. 705 (3d Dep't 1937), afJ'd,
274 N.Y. 574, 10 N.E.2d 558 (1937).
53 Rakeshaw v. Cincinnati, 69 Ohio App. 504, 44 N.E.2d 278 (1942).
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contract.54 This difference has caused more than little discussion, many
authors feeling the marriage age minimum is yet too low.55
The common law age limits of twelve for the female and fourteen for
the male have generally been raised by statute to the age of sixteen for
the female and eighteen for the male. 56 At common law, the marriage
of a person under the legal age was not void ab initio, but possessed the
status of mere voidability.57 American statutes in great uniformity follow
this rule although the word "void" is frequently used in the statute.58
The result follows that legality is given to the relationship and its
validity will be questioned only in a suit instituted for that purpose. 59
As a voidable marriage, the consequent duties and obligations must be
fulfilled. 60 A minority of the statutes specifically provide that marriage
by persons under the legal age is absolutely void and requires no decree
for its nullity. However, a moving party is given the right to an adjudica-
tion as to the date of birth of the spouse in question and a determination
of voidness if the age is lacking.6
Annulment of a marriage by parties under the statutory age is not a
matter of right; the discretion of a court of equity must be invoked.6 2
Non-age alone is insufficient as an inducement for a court to decree a
solemnly celebrated marriage void.63 There must be circumstances tend-
ing to show complete error by the parties. A decree of annulment, in
most states, renders the marriage void ab initio,64 and ceases all existing
rights.
Issue born of participants to such a marriage previous to a decree of
annulment are deemed to have been born in wedlock and are therefore
54 1 VERNIER, AmERicA F Vmny LAWS § 29 (1931).
55 PECK, TnE LAW OF PERSONS OR DOMEsTIc RELATIONS 6 (1913): "While other
contracts may be made by persons of twenty-one years of age or over, the marriage
contract - the most important of all, and the one in which imposition is at least as
likely to be practiced, and youth and inexperience as likely to lead one to act un-
wisely as in any other - may be entered into by boys and girls of much younger
age."
56 For a table giving the statutory age limits in each jurisdiction see 1 VERNIER,
AMERICAN FAmmy LAWS § 29 (1931).
57 See cases cited in Jordan v. Manning, 2 Tenn. C.C.A. 130 (1911).
58 For an example of such judicial interpretation see Keith v. Pack, 182 Tenn.
420, 187 S.W.2d 618 (1945).
59 Kibler v. Kibler, 180 Ark. 1152, 24 S.W.2d 867 (1930); Cruickshank v. Cruick-
shank, 193 Misc. 366, 82 N.Y.S.2d 522 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
60 Kibler v. Kibler, 180 Ark. 1152, 24 S.W.2d 867 (1930).
61 For an example of such a statute and decision see Evans v. Ross, 309 Mich.
149, 14 N.W.2d 815 (1944).
62 Mitchell v. Mitchell, 219 Ark. 69, 239 S.W.2d 748 (1951) (the word "may"
used in the statute does not mean "shall") ; Selakoff v. Selakoff, 196 Misc. 544, 92
N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
63 Gerardi v. Gerardi, 69 F. Supp. 296 (D.D.C. 1946).
64 Anonymous v. Anonymous, 85 A.2d 706 (Del. 1951), ajfd sub nom., Du Pont
v. Du Pont, 90 A.2d 468, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836 (1952).
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legitimate. 65 It has even been held that it is immaterial whether the child
was conceived prior to or subsequent to the marriage ceremony.66 This
holding was pursuant to a statute in force in most states creating a
strong, though rebuttable, presumption of legitimacy, and mere evidence
of non-paternity and subsequent annulment was insufficient to rebutt
the presumption. New York statutes are construed as stating that the
ceremony itself is the only factor which will legitimate issue of the re-
lationship.67 However, it was expressed that the realization of the
identity of the parents ought to be sufficient to protect the unoffending
child. The children, after annulment, are entitled to support notwith-
standing the fact that the mother has lost all her marital rights 8 The
party chargeable with support must provide more than mere necessities;
the contribution must be for guidance, care, nursing and education
commensurate with financial ability. 9 Even where the mother remarries,
a child of the first marriage will be considered a dependent of the father
if acts of the father indicate such to be his desire.
70
A woman called upon to defend in an annulment proceeding is usually
entitled to recover attorney's fees and other expenses on appeal, and the
rule applies even though there is cohabitation subsequent to the attain-
ment of a majority.71 New Mexico has one of the more liberal provisions,
stipulating that alimony must be paid in spite of the annulment until the
under-age female married to a male over the prohibited age has arrived
at her majority or has remarried.7 2
C. Effect of Remarriage Within a Prohibited Statutory Period.
Subsequent to an absolute divorce, either party is free to remarry;
the effect of the decree is the restoration of the contractants to the status
65 Sirois v. Sirois, 94 N.H. 215, 50 A.2d 88, 89 (1946) ; Stone v. Stone, 193 Okla.
458, 145 P.2d 212 (1944).
66 Stone v. Stone, 193 Okla. 458, 145 P.2d 212 (1944).
67 Bentley v. Bentley, 191 Misc. 972, 76 N.Y.S.2d 877, 879-80 (N.Y. Dom. Rel.
Ct. 1948), held: "A child, when born in wedlock or out of wedlock, is a child and
should be so regarded within the meaning of the law. This Court has been created
largely for the protection of children. I never could understand why a child born out
of wedlock shauld be called illegitimate. If there is any illegitimacy connected with
the birth of the child, it lies upon the shoulders of the parents and should rest there.
The child is only the victim if it suffers by reason of the fact that the parents had
not gone through a marriage ceremony."
68 Kibler v. Kibler, 180 Ark. 1152, 24 S.W.2d 867, 869 (1930) (holding that the
obligations continue and the father's duty to the child may be enforced by appro-
priate order of the court). Accord, Hood v. Hood, 206 Ark. 1057, 178 S.W.2d 670,
673 (1944) ; May v. Meade, 236 Mich. 109, 210 N.W. 305 (1926).
69 Bentley v. Bentley, 191 Misc. 972, 76 N.Y.S.2d 877, 880 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct.
1948).
70 May v. Meade, 236 Mich. 109, 210 N.W. 305 (1926).
71 Stone v. Stone, 193 Okla. 458, 145 P.2d 212 (1944); Portwood v. Portwood,
109 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
72 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 65-109 (1941).
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of single persons. This rule is applicable only in the absence of a
statutory prohibition, and thirty-six American jurisdictions have by
express legislation limited this right of remarriage.73 The purpose of such
legislation is to prevent "temptations" which frequently arise to secure
a decree of divorce for "collusive" benefits.74 Generally, statutes enacted
regarding such marriages are of three types: (1) those declaring marriage
within the prohibited time to be void; 75 (2) those declaring void a mar-
riage pending time for appeal;76 and (3) those which merely prohibit
remarriage within an express period of time.7 7 The majority provision
stipulates that such marriages, without reference to guilt or innocence.
are in contravention to public law and therefore absolutely void. 78 A
minority holding deems remariage within the prohibited period to be
merely a voidable relationship and valid for all purposes in spite of the
prohibition, the reason being that the statute fails to expressly declare
the nullity.79
The courts are divided as to whether there is an absolute right to
decretal dissolution when the parties possessed actual knowledge of the
impediment. Generally a court of equity will not annul a marriage where
the contractants disregard any statute and then seek equitable relief.80
Other cases have held that in light of the voidness of a prohibited second
marriage, an annulment will be decreed without reference to guilt or
innocence. 8 1 Where the parties are in pari delicto, they will be left in the
position in which the court found them even though fraud is shown.8 2
The respective parties to a marriage within the prohibited time after
divorce gain no marital rights. The supposed wife acquires no claim
73 For a compilation of the law in the states see 2 VEuRIE, Am uaCAN F~r.y
LAWS § 92 (1932).
74 Heflinger v. Heflinger, 136 Va. 289, 118 S.E. 316, 323 (1923).
75 In re Elliott's Estate, 165 Cal. 339, 132 Pac. 439 (1913) (a void marriage and
may be questioned by anyone interested); Pettit v. Pettit, 105 App. Div. 312, 93
N.Y. Supp. 1001 (3rd Dep't 1905) (such marriage void regardless of where con-
tracted).
76 Wallace v. McDaniel, 59 Ore. 378, 117 Pac. 314 (1911).
77 Exemplary of such a statute is that applied in Opdyke v. Opdyke, 237 Mich.
417, 212 N.V. 95 (1927).
78 Hahn v. Hahn, 104 Wash. 227, 176 Pac. 3 (1918).
79 1 Bisnop, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION § 435 (1891). For an example
of the application of a typical statute see Gress v. Gress, 209 S.W.2d 1003 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1948).
80 White v. Kessler, 101 N.J. Eq. 369, 139 Atl. 241 (Ch. 1927).
81 Blinn v. Blinn, 122 Pa. Super. 452, 186 AtI. 281 (1936); Hahn v. Hahn, 104
Wash. 227, 176 Pac. 3 (1918).
82 Szlauzis v. Szlauzis, 255 Ill. 314, 99 N.E. 640 (1912). In this case the wife,
who had no intention of performing the marital duties, acquired all of the husband's
property in anticipation of the marriage. She was allowed to keep title, even though
her admitted motive was to secure possession of the property and then abandon the
husband.
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against her husband or his heirs.8 3 Nor would the husband be entitled to
such rights as to sue on the wife's behalf.84 It has even been held that the
wife may be ejected as a trespasser.8 5 It has also been held that in spite
of a second marriage by a wife to one unable to marry, she still retains
her marital rights accruing from her first husband so that death of the
husband will give her those benefits she would normally possess. 86
The jurisdiction holding that remarriage prior to the expiration of the
statutory period is merely voidable demand direct attack during the
lifetime of both of the parties; otherwise, rights acquired during the
relationship will not be disturbed8 7 Under the estoppel theory, the
husband if he is alone guilty will be refused an annulment by the inequity
of his actions.8
8
Unless interdicted by a "saving" statute, the issue of marriages pro-
hibited because of non-compliance with the statutory time limit are
considered illegitimate and deprived of all civil rights.89 It is to be
remembered, however, that a majority of the jurisdictions in the United
States have "good faith" statutes which apply to certain marriages null
and void in law, and such confer all legal rights granted to heirs at law. 0
Remarriage within the statutory period pending appeal is considered
void ab initio by states having such legislation, and is creative of no
rights to either party 1 This rule applies even though the marriage is
contracted in a sister state having no such legislation 2 However, the
same case held that if the appeal is not completely perfected within the
alloted time, the living party will be considered the lawful heir. In light
of a presumption of legality, the parties who would otherwise be interest-
ed will be deemed to have waived their respective rights.
83 Barfield v. Barfield, 139 Ala. 290, 35 So. 884 (1903); Baker v. Baker, 168 Ga.
478, 184 S.E. 151 (1929) (loss of dower); Dye v. Dye, 140 App. Div. 309, 125 N.Y.
Supp. 242 (1st Dep't 1910) (barring the right to alimony); Atkeson v. Sovereign
Camp, 90 Okla. 154, 216 Pac. 467 (1923) (denying the benefit of an insurance pol-
icy). But cf. Freeman v. Fowler Packing Co., 135 Kan. 378, 11 P.2d 276 (1932)
(workmen's compensation payments were allowed on the theory that a subsequent
common law marriage had been effected); Vitoff v. Vitoff, 90 N.Y.S.2d 534 (Sup. Ct.
1948) (right of support was decreed under the common law marriage).
84 Tozier v. Haverhill and A St. Ry. Co., 187 Mass. 179, 72 N.E. 953 (1904).
85 Kennedy v. Orem, 31 Pa. Co. Ct. 476 (1905).
86 Gulf States Steel Co. v. Witherspoon, 214 Ala. 529, 108 So. 573 (1926) ; Hall
v. Baylous, 109 W.Va. 1, 153 S.E. 293 (1930).
ST Woodward v. Blake, 38 N.D. 38, 164 N.W. 156 (1917).
88 Gress v. Gress, 209 S.W.2d 1003 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
89 Peerless v. Burckhard, 90 Wash. 221, 155 Pac. 1037 (1916).
90 Typifying such a statute is that contained in Thomas v. Murphy, 107 F.2d
268 (D.C. Cir. 1939), where it was held that even though the marriage was pro-
hibited judicial cognizance would be taken of the status of husband and wife to
protect innocent parties.
91 McLennan v. McLennan, 31 Ore. 480, 50 Pac. 802 (1897).
92 Wallace v. McDaniel, 59 Ore. 378, 117 Pac. 314 (1911).
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The marriage being void, land conveyed to the parties as man and
wife passes to them as a joint tenancy or a tenancy in common; the
rights of tenants by the entireties simply do not accrue. An attempted
sale by the surviving spouse results only in the sale of the interest of
the grantor and the legal heirs of the deceased party have claim to the
remaining share.98
When the decree of divorce specifically prohibits remarriage during
the lifetime of the other spouse, a presumption of death after the expira-
tion of the statutory period of absence does not apply. It has been held
that there must be actual proof of the decease of the other spouse.9 4
D. Effect of a Miscegenetic Marriage.
Geographically, the states having legislation prohibiting marriage be-
tween members of the Caucasian race and races of "other types" are
easily definitive. Basically, the problem is social, with factors creative
of racial prejudice playing the dominant part. In the United States, the
South and the Far West may be termed appropriately the "strict adher-
ents" to the theory of the necessity of class distinction.
Generally, marriages prohibited are those between whites and Negroes
or Mongolians, with the various statutes differing on their definitions
regarding Negro blood. The term Mongolian is held to include Chinese,
Japanese, Malayans and Koreans. The great majority of the states
having such statutes expressly enact that inter-racial marriages are void
ab initio95 and require no decretal order of dissolution.9 6 Only one state,
West Virginia, provides that these marriages must be judicially decreed a
nullity before they may be collaterally attacked.97 An interesting effect
of miscegenetic marriages centers about penal consequences, many states
providing for criminal penalties for participants to such a marriage.9 8
It has been held that the prohibition of inter-racial marriages does not
violate the anti-discrimination amendments of the Constitution, the pro-
hibition applying equally to both whites and Negroes.9 9 But the statute
must be neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, or it will receive condem-
nation as a denial of equal protection of the laws.100
Miscegenetic marriages being void, there can be no claim to any
marital rights; 101 the community property states even deprive the con-
93 Wright v. Kaynor, 150 Mich. 7, 113 N.W. 779 (1907).
94 In re Tabor, 31 Misc. 579, 65 N.Y. Supp. 571 (Surr. Ct. 1900).
95 State v. Pass, 59 Ariz. 16, 121 P.2d 882 (1942) ; In re Stark's Estate, 48 Cal.
App.2d 209, 119 P.2d 961 (1942) ; Carter v. Veith, 139 La. 534, 71 So. 792 (1916) ;
In re Takahashi's Estate, 113 Mont. 490, 129 P.2d 217 (1942); Eggers v. Olson, 104
Okla. 296, 231 Pac. 483 (1924).
96 Carter V. Veith, 139 La. 534, 71 So. 792 (1916).
97 W.VA. CODE ANN. § 4701 (1949).
98 Jackson v. City and County of Denver, 109 Colo. 196, 124 P.2d 240 (1942).
99 Ibid.
100 Perez v. Leppold, 32 Cal.2d 711, 198 P.2d 17, 29 (1948).
101 Stevens v. United States, 146 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1947) (a miscegenetic mar-
riage was held not to revoke a prior will); Long v. Brown, 186 Okla. 407, 98 P.2d
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tractants of any claim under that system of property ownership.10 2 It
has been held, that a Negro mistress may be devised the estate of
white testator where the parties live together but do not consider them-
selves as man and wife. The court held that the parties had .not intended
to be married; thus the rule was not applicable.
10 3
A more prevailing problem concerning miscegenetic marriages arises
when the parties leave the state of their domicile and contract marriage
in a sister state which has no such statutory prohibition and then return
to the original state. The intent of the parties is the dominant factor
guiding a court in determining whether the marriage is to be recognized.
It is generally conceded that if the intent was a circumvention of the
statute, comity will not demand that validity be given to the union.,
0 4
If the parties act with no intent to evade the prohibition, equitable
protection will be afforded them. In Miller v. Lucks,10 5 the contractants,
a white man and a Negress, left the State of Mississippi, married, and set
up domicile in the State of Illinois. The Mississippi court held that in
light of the fact that there was no intent to evade the statute, the hus-
band was entitled to inherit real property of the Negress which was
situate in Mississippi in spite of the prohibition.
Issue of a miscegenetic marriage, where prohibited, are, strictly speak-
ing, bastards,'1 6 unless there is the interdiction of a legitimating statute.
States having such legislation preserve the rights of the children as
natural born heirs. 10 7 However, before the legitimating statute becomes
operative, there must have been a ceremony and an honest belief in the
validity of the marriage.108 Children born prior to the ceremony are
deemed illegitimate, although they may later be acknowledged.' 0 9 The
statute is also held inapplicable when the marriage ceremony is cele-
brated outside the state in an effort to evade the prohibition." 0
28 (1939) (the heir of a creek Indian mother was held to own the land in question
and could bring ejectment despite a sale by the Negro husband); Baker v. Carter,
180 Okla. 71, 180 P.2d 85 (1937) (alimony was denied to the complainant, there
never having been a marriage).
102 Eggers v. Olson, 104 Okla. 297, 231 Pac. 483, 486 (1924); Ryan v. Barth-
lelmy, 32 So.2d 467, (La. App. 1947) (recordation of a homestead declaration by the
Negro wife was held to be of no effect, the supposed wife possessing no property
rights against the vendee of her husband).
103 Dees v. Metts, 245 Ala. 307, 17 So.2d 137 (1944).
104 In re Takahaski's Estate, 113 Mont. 490, 129 P.2d 217 (1942).
105 203 Miss. 824, 36 So.2d 140 (1948).
106 In re Stark's Estate, 48 Cal. App.2d 209, 119 P.2d 961 (1941).
107 E.g., LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 117-18 (West 1952).
108 In re Walker's Estate, 5 Ariz. 70, 46 Pac. 67 (1896).
109 Bates v. Meade, 174 Ky. 545, i92 S.W. 666 (1917).
110 Greenhow v. James' Ex'r, 80 Va. 636, 647 (1885), but a strong dissent held
that the law is "founded in the enlightened humane policy which disdains to visit the
sins of the parent upon the unoffending child."
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An unique set of circumstances was presented in Application of
Barug.111 The petitioner for naturalization, a party to a previous inter-
racial marriage, was questioned as to his requisite "good moral char-
acter." The court held that his rights were predicated upon his good
faith, not an "abstruse quantity." As he was firm in the belief of the
validity of his actions, the petitioner was not denied naturalization.
E. Effect of an Incestuous Marriage.
An incestuous marriage denotes the union of a man and woman who
are within the prohibited degrees of relationship, either by consanguinity
or affinity. Consanguinity embraces all persons of common ancestral
blood; affinity includes the relationship arising from marriage and exist-
ing between one spouse and the blood relations of the other spouse. At
common law and in the absence of a statute providing otherwise, such
a marriage is merely voidable during the lives of the parties, and unless
so avoided, must be deemed valid for all civil purposes.1 2 However, the
greater number of statutes in force in American jurisdictions provide
generally that marriages within these prohibited degrees are void ab
initio,113 and require no decree of dissolution." 4 A minority of the states
have enacted that incestuous marriages, although null and void in law,
are valid for all purposes until a decretal order of nullity has been
issued.115 So strong is the sentiment against this type of marriage in some
states that an annulment will be granted regardless of where the cere-
mony was performed,116 and the ancient maxim of equity demanding
"clean hands" of the moving party is ignored when incest is involved."17
Good faith by at least one of the parties believing in the validity of
the ceremony will produce civil protection under statutes in many states
in spite of the nullity.118 Bona fide will also serve to legitimate all off-
spring, most states expressly providing that even though a specific mar-
riage is null and void in law, the issue will nonetheless be considered
Ill 76 F. Supp. 407 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
112 Bonham v. Badgley, 7 Ill. (2 Gilm.) 622 (1845).
113 1 VERNIER, AmERICAN FAmny LAWS § 38 (1931).
114 Osoinach v. Watkins, 235 Ala. 564, 180 So. 577 (1938); Ragan v. Cox, 208
Ark. 809, 187 S.W.2d 874 (1945) ; Ex parte Bowen, 247 S.W.2d 379 (Ky. 1952).
115 Johnson v. Landefeld, 138 Fla. 511, 189 So. 666 (1939); Goldman v. Dith-
rich, 131 Fla. 408, 179 So. 715, 716 (1938) (interpreting West Virginia law). Accord.
Walker v. Walker, 54 Ohio L. Abst. 153, 84 N.E.2d 258 (1948).
116 Johnson v. Johnson, 57 Wash. 89, 106 Pac. 500 (1910).
11"7 McClain v. McClain, 40 Pa. Super. 248 (1909); Martin v. Martin, 54 W.Va.
301, 46 S.E. 120 (1903). Arado v. Arado, 281 Ill. 123, 117 N.E. 816, 818 (1917)
states: "The general rule that equity will not entertain the complaint of one who
comes into the court with unclean hands does not apply, and if a party to an illegal
marriage is so wanting in honor as to be willing to publish his own criminal offense
and disgrace and humiliate his children and one with whom he has lived in the
marital relation, the public interest requires that he should not be prevented from
doing so. The defendant was not barred from alleging the illegality of the marriage."
118 E.g., note 107 supra.
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legitimate. 119 It has even been held that such a statute is applicable if
the children are begotten prior to the void ceremony, and the children
thereby are not stigmatized.120 However, the birth of issue to the partici-
pants of an incestuous marriage is not of itself sufficient to .render the
marriage merely voidable.
12 1
In the absence of innocence, no marital or property rights accrue to
either party to the marriage,122 but the result is otherwise if the statute
requires judicial recognition of the nullity during the lives of the
parties' 123 Under the last stated holding, death of one spouse before
issuance of a decree of voidness will afford the parties concerned and
their issue rights of heirship.
The husband to an incestuous marriage may also be liable for dam-
ages if the wife was ignorant of the impediment. This holding is born
out by the decision in Ragan v. Cox,'124 wherein the plaintiff, a twelve
year old girl, brought an action for damages against her uncle and a
justice of the peace who performed the ceremony, alleging that the
defendants had knowledge of the impediment and that she was in com-
plete ignorance. She claimed loss of reputation. The court held that the
two men were jointly liable for their actions.
New York perhaps has taken the initial step in recognizing the validity
of such a marriage specifically prohibited by its laws. The plaintiff mar-
ried her uncle in a foreign country where the marriage was also pro-
hibited, but in that country an exemption was recognized when approval
was obtained from civil authorities, as had been done. The court held
that under these facts they had no right to question the marriage. 25
II
Effect of the Removal of an Impediment.
Continued cohabitation subsequent to the removal of an impediment
to an otherwise validily contracted marriage entered into in good faith
constitutes a valid informal marriage. But this rule is sustained only in
those states which recognize common law marriage. This principle is
often confused with the theory of ratification of a previous marriage
119 For an application of such a statute see Mund v. Rehaume, 51 Colo. 129, 117
Pac. 159 (1911).
120 Bates v. Meade, 174 Ky. 545, 192 S.W. 666 (1917).
121 Walker v. Walker, 54 Ohio L. Abst. 153, 84 N.E.2d 258 (1948).
122 Osoinach v. Watkins, 235 Ala. 564, 180 So. 577 (1938) ; Ex Parte Bowen, 247
S.W.2d 379 (Ky. 1952). But cf. Johnson v. Landefeld, 138 Fla. 511, 189 So. 666
(1939).
123 Tyler v. Andrews, 40 App. D.C. 100 (1913).
124 208 Ark. 809, 187 S.W.2d 874 (1945).
125 Campione v. Campione, 201 Misc. 590, 107 N.Y.S.2d 170 (Sup. Ct. 1951),
(construing N.Y. DomEsTic RELAT oNS LAW § 5).
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which has been dissolved. The impediment, however, precludes the valid-
ity of the former marriage and ratification is not applicable.1 26
The test to determine whether a common law marriage has been con-
tracted demands a bona fide agreement in praesenti to live as man and
wife, and cohabitation under the presumption of that relationship. 127 It
has been said, however, that consent itself is sufficient to validate the
marriage, it being unnecessary to have cohabitation after the removal of
the impediment.' 28 After the removal of the disability to a validly con-
tracted marriage, the requisite intent is said to continue from the original
void ceremony,1 29 or the matrimonial consent may also be inferred from
the acts of the parties. 30 It is immaterial whether the initial ceremony
was solemnly celebrated 131 or merely informal at the time of contract. 132
The doctrine applies in all cases where it is possible for the impediment
to be removed. A valid informal marriage assented to only for a specific
purpose with an intent to terminate the relationship upon the achieve-
ment of that purpose is deemed not to establish any marital union and
is void. 133 By the same token, a common law marriage after the disability
removed is terminated only by death of one of the parties or by dissolu-
tion by a court of competent jurisdiction. 134
Immediately upon the removal of the impediment the relationship
becomes valid for all purposes. 135 However, it is generally conceded that
the parties must possess the present intent to continue as man and wife
even after the removal of the impediment, or such removal is meaning-
less.136 Cohabitation itself is insufficient; there must be some proof or
inference of a plan to accept each other maritally. However, it has been
held that although the removal of the disability is unknown to the
parties, a common law marriage may still be effected by uninterruped
cohabitation and reputation after removal of the impediment. 137 Even if
the parties are aware of the disability, a valid informal marriage may
result if, at the time of removal, a contract for an in praesenti marital
126 Lewis v. Dep't of Labor and Industries, 190 Wash. 620, 70 P.2d 298 (1937).
127 Levanosky v. Levanosky, 311 Mass. 638, 42 N.E.2d 561, 562 (1942) ; Brodock
v. Brodock, 243 Mich. 505, 220 N.W. 720 (1928).
128 Sturm v. Sturm, 111 N.J. Eq. 579, 163 Atl. 5, 9 (Ch. 1932).
129 Addison v. Addison, 186 Ga. 155, 197 S.E. 232, 233 (1938).
130 Dibble v. Dibble, 88 Ohio App. 490, 100 N.E.2d 451, 460 (1950); Bowles v.
McCarty, 195 Okla. 252, 157 P.2d 179 (1945).
131 Addison v. Addison, 186 Ga. 155, 197 S.E. 232, 233 (1938) ; Nicholas v. Idaho
Power Co., 63 Idaho 675, 125 P.2d 321 (1942); Hess v. Pettigrew, 261 Mich. 618,
247 N.W. 90 (1933).
132 Oatis v. Mingo, 199 Miss. 896, 26 So.2d 453 (1946); Sturm v. Sturm, 111
N.J. Eq. 579, 163 Ati. 5, 9 (Ch. 1932).
133 United States v. Lutwak, 195 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1952).
134 Dibble v. Dibble, 88 Ohio App. 490, 100 N.E.2d 451 (1950).
135 Hoffman v. Hoffman, 242 Wis. 83, 7 N.W.2d 428 (1943).
136 Jones v. General Motors Corp., 310 Mich. 605, 17 N.W.2d 770 (1945).
137 Hess v. Pettigrew, 261 Mich. 618, 247 N.W. 90 (1933).
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relationship is entered into.138 A new agreement must also be in force
where the parties discontinue cohabitation after the impediment has
been removed.139 It is not mandatory that both contractants believe in
the validity of the marriage ceremony; good faith by either is sufficient
to establish the requisite proof of a non-meretricious relation. 40 As in an
otherwise valid marriage, both parties must assume all marital duties and
obligations and will be given all usual property rights. 141
If the relationship is meretricious in its inception and is accepted as
such by the parties, the illicity of the union will be presumed to continue
and will not ripen into marriage, unless there is a strong showing that a
new contract has been entered into or that the former relationship has
been altered.142 This is especially true where the intent of the parties
was originally illicit and the removal of the impediment has been un-
known to them.1
43
Some states, including Massachusetts, have provided another means
of validating a marriage prohibited by statute, but in which the dis-
ability has been removed. Although a common law marriage will not be
given recognition, statutory enactment affirms all marriages after the
impediment has been removed if the original ceremony was entered into
in good faith by both participants.144
Even though a void or voidable ceremony was performed in a juris-
diction which does not recognize common law marriages, such a mar-
riage may result if the parties later establish domicile in a state which
does recognize common law marriages and there is a continuance of the
consent to abide as man and wife.145 This same rule applies when the
statutory formalities are not complied with in the state where the cere-
mony was initially contracted. The setting up of domicile in a second
state results in a valid informal marriage, unless also prohibited in that
state.146
138 Pierce v. Pierce, 379 11l. 185, 39 N.E.2d 990 (1942) (construing Nevada law);
In re Franchi's Estate, 119 N.J. Eq. 457, 182 AtI. 887, 891 (Prerog. Ct.), af'd, 121
N.J. Eq. 47, 187 AtI. 371 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936).
139 Anonymous v. Anonymous, 174 Misc. 906, 22 N.Y.S.2d 598 (N.Y. Doam. Rel.
Ct. 1940).
140 Hoffman v. Hoffman, 242 Wis. 83, 7 N.W.2d 428 (1943).
141 In re Lambert's Estate, 116 Ind. App. 293, 62 N.E.2d 871 (1945) (wife was
entitled to share in the estate of the deceased) ; Oatis v. Mingo, 199 Miss. 896, 26
So.2d 453 (1946) (a deed not signed by the common law wife is void); Consolidated
Underwriters v. Taylor, 197 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) (wife was entitled to
workmen's compensation).
142 Jones v. Kemp, 144 F.2d 478 (10th Cir. 1944).
143 Monroe v. Kantor, 10 N.J. Misc. 942, 161 At. 833 (Workmen's Comp. Bur-
eau, Dep't Labor 1932).
144 For an example of such a statute see Hopkins v. Hopkins, 287 Mass. 542, 192
N.E. 145 (1934).
145 Sturm v. Sturm, 111 NJ. Eq. 579, 163 AUt. 5 (Ch. 1932).
146 Grammas v. Kettle, 306 Mich. 308, 10 N.W.2d 895 (1943).
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Conclusion
It is unquestioned that since the era of common law, state legislatures,
guided by humane considerations, have done much to protect and provide
for innocent parties to an impeded marriage. Included in these statutes
are the unoffending children born of the union. However, there is a
great statutory divergence as to the particular types of impediments
which will not deprive a child of the status of legitimacy. 147 Although
statutes in many states provide for legitimatization of the issue of all
prohibited marriages, prejudice in certain jurisdictions is said to be too
dominating a factor for some legislatures to provide to that extent.
Bastardy, attended with all its undesirable consequences, still prevails in
these jurisdictions without regard to the element of good faith on the
part of either of the contractants.
It is difficult to conceive of any valid basis for this difference in policy
as reflected in statutory impediments which will deprive the children of
a given marriage of legitimacy. Concededly, a statute, providing that
issue of a particular marriage are to be considered bastards, will afford
some incentive to the parties to refrain from open meretriciousness. How-
ever, it is also true that in many of these marriages, regardless of the
type of impediment, one or both of the parties will be in complete
ignorance of the disability. Nevertheless, the children are stigmatized.
Such a situation is most undesirable both as to an innocent spouse and
the unoffending children.
It is submitted that, in all prohibited marriages, the test of legitimacy
should be dependent upon the good faith of either or both of the parties
to the contract, not the public feeling of a particular state. Granted that
bigamy, "etc." is disdainful to all and in many cases should be punish-
able, this is no reason why innocence should suffer. The distinction
between good and bad faith is not to be denied.
A typification of an ideal statute would be that of Louisiana, which
provides: 148
The marriage, which has been declared null, produces nevertheless its
civil effects as it relates to the parties and their children, if it has been
contracted in good faith.
If only one of the parties acted in good faith, the marriage produces
its civil effects only in his or her favor, and in favor of the children
born of the marriage.
Thus, "though a child may be adulterine in fact, it may be legitimate for
all purposes of inheriting from its parents, if one or either of them inter-
married in good faith." 149 Law is regarded as being founded on humane
147 1 VzsERz, AERzic FA.i.y LAws § 48 (1931).
148 LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 117-18 (West 1952).
149 Gaines v. Hennen, 65 U.S. 553 (1861).
